After this lesson you can name the main computer-based systems found on a merchant ship and what each one does — ECDIS, AIS, radar, GNSS, GMDSS, VDR, IAS, AMS, PMS and propulsion and steering control — tell which are IT and which are OT, describe the paths that connect them to each other and to shore, and explain the security-zone rules in IACS UR E26 section 4.2.1, including which systems must be kept apart and which must be physically separated.
Lesson 28 explained why a ship is a different place to defend. Before we can talk about attacks (Lesson 30) or defences, we need a map: what is actually on board, and how is it wired together? A security officer who cannot draw the ship's network is in the same position as a navigator without a chart.
The IMO Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management give a useful first list of the systems that matter: bridge systems; cargo, bunkering, ballast and other pumping systems; propulsion, machinery and power control; security and access control; passenger and crew servicing systems; public-facing networks for passengers and crew; administrative and crew welfare systems; ship-port interfaces; and ship-to-shore integrated systems. This lesson walks through them from the bridge down.
The descriptions of equipment below are generic and simplified for teaching. Every ship is different, and the real answer for any vessel is in its own asset inventory and network drawings.
1. The Bridge — Navigation and Communication
The bridge holds the systems the officer of the watch uses to know where the ship is, what is around it, and how to call for help. IACS UR E26 includes in its scope the “navigational systems required by statutory regulations” and the “internal and external communication systems required by class rules and statutory regulations”.
Many of these systems exchange data over the bridge's sensor network using maritime interface standards. E26 notes that navigation and radio equipment approved to IEC 61162-460 — a standard for securing these maritime networks — or an equivalent standard may be accepted in place of the E27 security capabilities, provided E26 itself is met.
2. The Engine Room — Automation, Power and Propulsion
Below decks, computers watch and control the machinery that keeps the ship moving and powered. E26 lists the functions whose control systems must be considered: propulsion, steering, anchoring and mooring, electrical power generation and distribution, fire detection and extinguishing, bilge and ballast systems and the loading computer, watertight integrity and flooding detection, lighting, and required safety systems such as emergency shutdown and gas detection.
Inside these systems sit PLCs (programmable logic controllers): small, rugged computers that read sensors and drive valves, pumps and motors. IACS UR E27 lists the kinds of equipment it covers as network devices (routers, managed switches), security devices (firewalls, intrusion detection), computers (workstations, servers), automation devices such as PLCs, and cloud-hosted virtual machines.
3. Cargo, Safety and the Ship's Office
Cargo systems depend on the ship type: cargo pumps and tank gauging on a tanker, reefer monitoring on a container ship, ballast control and the loading computer on almost every ship. Safety systems — fire detection, fixed fire-extinguishing release, flooding detection and emergency shutdown — protect life and must work every time.
Alongside the OT sits ordinary IT: the master's and chief engineer's office computers, a server or file share for the ship's documents, email, and the planned-maintenance and procurement software that reports to the office ashore. Then there is the crew welfare network, giving crew members Internet access for their own phones and laptops, and on passenger ships the passenger networks.
E26 is precise about where these belong. Administrative networks, crew welfare systems, passenger networks and passenger servicing systems are not themselves in the scope of the rule, but any IP-based communication interface between an in-scope OT system and them is in scope. Anything outside the scope is treated as an untrusted network.
4. The Paths That Join Everything
On paper, IT and OT are separate. In practice data has to move between them, and between ship and shore. These paths are where most security work happens:
5. Security Zones — How E26 Divides the Ship
A security zone, in E26's definition, is a collection of computer-based systems that meet the same security requirements, with an access-control policy applied to its interfaces. Think of the ship's watertight bulkheads: a breach in one compartment should not flood the next. Zones do the same for a cyber incident. E26 explains that segmentation reduces the attack surface and prevents attackers from moving laterally between systems.
The core requirements of E26 section 4.2.1, in plain words:
At the design stage E26 asks for drawings showing the zones, the systems in each and where they are physically located, every network communication within and between zones and with untrusted networks, and the boundary devices with the traffic they permit. At commissioning, the class society verifies that the zones are built as approved and that boundaries allow only the documented traffic. Boundaries must be protected by firewalls or equivalent means (4.2.2), and networks in scope must be continuously monitored, with alarms if malfunctions or degraded capacity occur (4.3.1).
A real case shows why the map matters. In July 2019 the U.S. Coast Guard issued Marine Safety Alert 06-19 about a deep-draft vessel bound for New York and New Jersey that reported a significant cyber incident in February 2019. Malware had significantly degraded the onboard computer system, although essential vessel control systems were not affected. The Coast Guard noted that the same shipboard network used for crew members' personal tasks was also used for official business — updating electronic charts, managing cargo data and communicating with shore — and that USB drives with cargo data were routinely plugged into the ship's computers without being scanned first.
The first measure the Coast Guard recommended was to segment networks, warning that “flat” networks let an adversary move easily to any system connected to them. That is exactly what E26's zones are for.
A useful exercise for any ship manager: take the ship's asset inventory (E26 4.1.1) and draw every network, every connection between networks, every link to shore and every place a USB drive or laptop is plugged in. Mark which connections pass through a controlled boundary and which do not. If nobody can draw it, that gap comes before any other control.
Lesson 30 now uses this map to look at the threats that travel along these paths.
- A ship carries bridge systems (ECDIS, GNSS, radar, AIS, GMDSS, VDR), machinery automation (IAS, AMS, PMS, propulsion and steering control), cargo and safety systems, plus office IT and crew welfare networks.
- IACS UR E26 covers OT for propulsion, steering, power, fire, bilge and ballast, watertight integrity, safety systems, and required navigation and communication systems — plus any IP interface from them to other systems.
- Office, crew welfare and passenger networks are “untrusted networks” in E26 and must be physically segmented from the required zones.
- The main paths in are ship-to-shore links, remote maintenance, updates and USB devices, wireless, and integration links between systems — each must be controlled and documented.
- E26 4.2.1: group systems into zones, allow only explicit traffic, keep safety systems physically apart, keep bridge systems apart from machinery and cargo, put wireless in its own zone, and make zones isolatable without losing their primary function.
- The USCG's 2019 safety alert shows the risk of a flat, shared network and unscanned USB drives; its first recommendation was to segment networks.
- IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.4 — Guidelines on maritime cyber risk management (28 May 2026)
- IACS UR E26 Rev.1 (Nov 2023) — Cyber resilience of ships
- IACS UR E27 Rev.1 (Sep 2023) — Cyber resilience of on-board systems and equipment (IACS Unified Requirements, section E)
- ITU-R Recommendation M.1371 — Technical characteristics for VHF automatic identification system using time division multiple access in the maritime mobile service
- U.S. Coast Guard — Marine Safety Alert 06-19: Cyber Incident Exposes Potential Vulnerabilities Onboard Commercial Vessels (8 July 2019)
- CISA — U.S. Coast Guard Releases Cybersecurity Measures for Commercial Vessels (8 July 2019)
Equipment descriptions are generic teaching summaries; the systems on any particular ship are defined by its own asset inventory and approved documentation. IACS requirements are paraphrased from the Rev.1 texts; consult the original for exact wording.
Captain Paul writes the Maritime Cybersecurity Learning Roadmap on ShipPaulJobs — a step-by-step course that takes readers from security fundamentals to the cyber resilience rules that now apply to ships.
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