One Europe, Two Shipbuilding Strategies: The Gap Between Brussels and Athens

Julius Shin

Maritime Technical Consultant · Shipboard Cybersecurity & Compliance
- LinkedIn : https://www.linkedin.com/in/abysstoinfinity

Introduction: In 2026, Europe Spoke About Shipbuilding Twice

In 2026, Europe gave two answers on how to rebuild its shipbuilding industry. In March, the European Commission in Brussels published its first standalone Industrial Maritime Strategy. In July, the Greek Shipyards Association in Athens unanimously approved the "Greek Shipbuilding Manifesto 2027–2035 & Project NEXUS."

Both documents start from the same crisis: global shipbuilding output is concentrated in a handful of places in Asia, and the EU's global share has fallen to about 5%. Yet their prescriptions are opposite. Brussels says, "Defend only where we can win." Athens says, "Redraw the whole board."

This article looks at why the two documents differ so sharply, and what that gap means for Korean shipbuilding and for the ship cybersecurity (UR E26) market.

Brussels' Answer: "Focus Where We Can Win"

The core of the EU Industrial Maritime Strategy (COM(2026) 111) is selection and concentration. It focuses policy resources on high-value segments where Europe still leads: cruise ships, naval vessels, icebreakers, research vessels, cable-laying ships and offshore wind support vessels. General-purpose container ships and ordinary cargo ships are left out.

The strategy is built on three pillars.

Pillar	Key measures
Build, Equip & Repair	Launch of an Industrial Maritime Value Chain Alliance, 'Shipyards of the Future' R&D calls, bundled public procurement with non-price and economic-security award criteria
Transport & Connect	Existing State aid guidelines retained, simplified ETS and FuelEU reporting
Secure & Protect	Expanded naval production capacity, support for dual-use ferries, investment in maritime domain awareness and cybersecurity

Three horizontal initiatives on innovation, finance and skills sit on top of these. The Commission estimates that shipyard digitalisation alone will require EUR 3–7.5 billion a year.

Its limits are also clear. The strategy imposes no legal obligations on the 27 member states. The Commission itself states that it has no legal effect on ongoing or future vessel procurement. Indeed, Sweden ordered an icebreaker from a Korean shipyard, citing a price difference of about 3.8%. On ETS revenues, too, the strategy only "recommends" that member states spend them on maritime investment.

Athens' Answer: "Redraw the Board"

The Greek manifesto was proposed by Panos Xenokostas, president of the association and chairman of ONEX Shipyards & Technologies. Its goal is to restore the global competitiveness of Greek shipbuilding by 2034. Its demands fall into six strands.

1.Tax and social-insurance treatment equal to ocean shipping, and fast-track entry of third-country technical staff within one month

2.Recycling EU ETS revenues back into the industry, funding a support mechanism that closes the Europe–Asia newbuilding cost gap

3.Investment tax credits of 100% for newbuilds and 50% for repairs (for Greek, European and US owners), and removal of State aid ceilings for shipbuilding hubs

4.Project NEXUS: a digital shipyard with collaborative robots, AI, and automated cutting and welding

5.Infrastructure for SMR-powered merchant ships after 2035, and preferential treatment for dual-use shipbuilding facilities

6.Recognition of Greece as the southern pillar of European defence, a Transatlantic Shipbuilding Pact with the US, and regaining a 33% Western share of global shipbuilding

The manifesto should be read as an opening negotiating position, not a policy document. But the backdrop is already real. ONEX revived the Elefsis Shipyards with US DFC funding and has formed the Project Trident strategic alliance with Hanwha Ocean. Skaramangas Shipyards has signed a surface combatant cooperation agreement with HD Hyundai Heavy Industries.

Why So Different: Five Structural Reasons

In one sentence: the EU is playing defence to protect the niches it already holds, while Greece, with little left to lose, is playing offence to enlarge the game.

Issue	EU strategy	Greek manifesto
Target scope	High-value niche segments	33% global share
State aid	Existing guidelines retained	Ceilings removed entirely
ETS revenues	Recommends partial allocation by member states	Mandatory return to industry
US cooperation	Barely mentioned	Transatlantic Shipbuilding Pact as a core pillar
Nuclear propulsion	Subject to regulatory overhaul	Infrastructure for SMR-powered ships after 2035

① Different authors.

The EU strategy is the lowest common denominator of 27 countries. The Greek manifesto is a lobbying document from an industry association, written from the start on the assumption that it would ask big and be cut down.

② Different starting points.

Shipyards in Italy, France, Germany and Finland are already competitive in cruise ships and naval vessels. What they need is defence. For Greek shipyards, restarted from the brink of bankruptcy, a niche strategy alone leaves almost nothing on the table.

③ State aid is the core of EU competition law.

Lifting aid ceilings would trigger a subsidy race among member states. To the established shipbuilding nations, Greece's demand sounds like a request to help raise a competitor.

④ ETS revenues belong to national treasuries.

A large share of shipping ETS revenue flows into member states' general budgets. As the world's largest shipowning nation, Greece is one of the biggest payers. The logic "the money our owners paid should go to our shipyards" follows naturally.

⑤ Different geopolitical axes.

The keyword of the EU strategy is strategic autonomy. Greece operates on a three-way structure of US DFC funding, agreements signed at the US Embassy, and Korean shipyards. If the EU moves slowly, Greece has already secured a bypass to deal directly with the United States.

There is a contradiction inside Greece as well. Greek owners have built their ships in Korea, China and Japan for decades. The tax credits are designed to change where they order, but whether owners will actually accept the higher cost is another matter.

Opposite Directions, Three Common Denominators

Although the two documents point in opposite directions, they overlap in three places. These common denominators will become reality whichever logic prevails.

▸Digital shipyards. The EU has put forward 'Shipyards of the Future', Greece Project NEXUS. Robotics, AI and digital production management become the shipyard standard.

▸Merging merchant and defence. The EU talks about expanding naval production and dual-use ferries; Greece about preferential treatment for dual-use facilities. A structure in which merchant ships and naval vessels are built in the same yard is encouraged by policy.

▸Criteria beyond price. The EU approaches this through non-price and economic-security criteria in public procurement, Greece by making "state-of-the-art specifications" a condition for support. The routes differ, but both point the same way: building cheaply alone will no longer earn the money.

Implications for Korean Shipbuilding

The Western shipbuilding revival is not a single bloc. It moves along three tracks: the United States (MAP, MASGA), the core EU states (niche defence), and Greek-style re-entrants. This fracture is both a threat and an opportunity for Korea.

Market	Character	Korea's position
United States	Rebuilding defence and merchant shipbuilding, leveraging allies	Direct investment and MRO through MASGA
Greek-style re-entrants	Short of technology and capital, linked to the US	Partner in design, technology transfer, equipment and MRO
Core EU states	Niche defence, stronger non-price criteria	Risk of price advantage being neutralised; respond with non-price evidence

The threat is medium-to-long term and limited. Greek shipyard capacity can hardly threaten the VLCC or large LNG carrier markets. Competition will play out in ferries, coastal vessels, tugs, offshore wind support vessels, naval ships and MRO.

The opportunity is already real. Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries are in place as technology partners of Greek shipyards. Even if the core EU states narrow the door, a channel is opening for indirect entry into the European market through Atlanticist member states.

The remaining question is positioning. The manifesto's list of allies is Greece, Europe and the United States. Korea is not on it. Whether Korea remains a technology supplier or becomes a co-production partner depends on the partnership structures being built now.

A Cybersecurity and UR E26 Perspective: Requirements Grow Whichever Side Wins

All three common denominators lead to expanded cybersecurity requirements. Ship cybersecurity is widening from "compliance for a single vessel" to the intersection of shipyards, supply chains and defence.

1. The E26 gap at restarted shipyards.

When Greek shipyards resume newbuilding, every one of those ships falls under IACS UR E26/E27. Yards that have not built new ships for decades have no experience with CBS documentation, Zone & Conduit design, test procedures or class approval. The know-how Korean shipyards have built in practice since July 2024 could become part of a technology transfer package.

2. A digital shipyard is itself an OT attack surface.

A shipyard with collaborative robots, automated welding and digital twins lies outside the scope of E26. That territory belongs to IEC 62443 and the EU's NIS2. If design data or a digital twin is tampered with, the compromise flows straight into the integrity of the delivered ship. Security during construction (secure-by-build) remains an empty space.

3. Merchant and defence requirements coexist in one yard.

Naval vessels are not subject to E26. In a dual-use shipyard, E26 applies alongside NATO and national defence requirements. The moment a yard enters the US defence supply chain, requirements such as CMMC follow.

4. Cyber resilience becomes a qualification for getting paid.

Whether through the EU's non-price procurement criteria or Greek-style subsidy conditions, cyber requirements are likely to be part of "state-of-the-art" specifications. Treating E26 as the minimum and demonstrating security above it becomes a differentiator.

5. Next on the agenda: autonomous ships and nuclear propulsion.

The EU has said it will overhaul the regulatory framework for both, and Greece has called for infrastructure for SMR-powered ships. Nuclear-powered merchant ships sit where ship cybersecurity meets nuclear facility security, an area that still has no rules.

6. Fast-track hiring increases insider risk.

When a large temporary workforce with short vetting periods enters a digital shipyard, personnel security and access control become mandatory elements of the shipyard security framework.

Conclusion: A Place Between the Fractures

The gap between Brussels and Athens is not a passing difference of opinion but a structural fracture within Europe. The established powers defend their niches; the new entrants enlarge the game and join hands with the United States.

Korea holds the rare position of being able to partner with both sides of this fracture. Holding that position takes more than price competitiveness. Digital shipyards, dual use and non-price criteria all demand cybersecurity and compliance capability. Over the next decade, shipbuilding orders will be decided as much by "how trustworthy" as by "how cheap."

Sources

·European Commission – EU Industrial Maritime Strategy, COM(2026) 111

·EU Blue Economy Observatory – Commission launches EU Industrial Maritime and Ports Strategies

·ArcticToday – The EU's industrial maritime strategy

·Hansa – EMIS: the gap between aspiration and reality

·Container News – Greek Shipyards Association unveils manifesto

·Naftemporiki – Xenokostas stresses need for a Transatlantic Shipbuilding Pact

·Naval News – Hanwha Ocean partners to strengthen Greece's shipbuilding

·Greek News Agenda – A new horizon for Greek shipbuilding

·gCaptain – Korea–U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center launches

Julius Shin

Maritime Technical Consultant · Shipboard Cybersecurity & Compliance

Owner-side maritime cybersecurity advisor covering IACS UR E26/E27 compliance, zone and conduit design, and OT/IT security architecture for commercial vessels — working across LR, ClassNK, DNV, ABS, and BV newbuilding projects.

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